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Introduction and summary
From the mid-1950s through 2008, the Detroit auto-
makers, once dubbed the “Big Three”—Chrysler LLC, 
Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation 
(GM)—lost over 40 percentage points of market share 
in the United States, after having dominated the indus-
try during its first 50 years. From today’s perspective, 
the elaborately designed tail fins that once adorned 
the Detroit automakers’ luxury marques symbolized 
the pinnacle of their market power. Fifty years later, 
the Detroit automakers were playing catch-up to com-
pete with Toyota’s very successful entry into the hybrid 
car segment, the Prius. By 2008, Toyota, the largest 
Japanese automaker, had become the largest producer 
of vehicles worldwide—a position that had been pre-
viously held by GM for 77 consecutive years. 
Currently, Chrysler, Ford, and GM, now collectively 
referred to as the “Detroit Three,” find themselves in 
dire straits. The financial crisis that began in 2007 and 
the accompanying sharp deceleration of vehicle sales 
during 2008 raise serious challenges for all automakers. 
The current troubles of the Detroit Three, however, are 
also rooted in longer-term trends. In this article, I look 
at the history of the three Detroit automakers from 
their heyday in the 1950s through the present, providing 
a helpful context for analyzing the current situation.  
I illustrate in broad strokes how the Detroit automakers 
lost nearly half of the market they once dominated. 
The auto industry has changed in many ways since 
the mid-1950s. The emergence of government regula-
tion for vehicle safety and emissions, the entry of for-
eign producers of auto parts and vehicles, a dramatic 
improvement in the quality of vehicles produced, and 
the implementation of a different production system stand 
out. Part of the transformation of the North American 
auto industry has been a remarkable decline of market 
power for the Detroit automakers over the past five-
plus decades (see figure 1). 
The industrial organization literature suggests 
that market shares can be a useful initial step in ana-
lyzing the competitiveness of an industry (see, for  
example, Carlton and Perloff, 1990, p. 739).1 By that 
metric, the U.S. auto industry of the 1950s and 1960s 
was highly concentrated among a small number of 
companies and therefore not very competitive. On the 
one hand, the substantial market share decline experi-
enced by the Detroit carmakers since then represents 
an increase in competition, resulting in more choices, 
tremendously improved vehicle quality, and increased 
vehicle affordability for consumers. On the other hand, 
the shift in market share from Detroit’s carmakers to 
foreign-headquartered producers has had important 
regional economic implications. Traditional locales  
of automotive activity in the Midwest continue to de-
cline as communities located in southern states, such 
as Kentucky and Tennessee, have seen a sizable in-
flux of auto-related manufacturing activity.2 For ex-
ample, between 2000 and 2008, the U.S. auto industry 
(that is, assembly and parts production combined), 
shed over 395,000 jobs; 42 percent of these job losses 
occurred in Michigan alone.3 These regional effects 
of the auto industry restructuring were heightened by 
the sharp industry downturn during 2008. 
Today, the Detroit Three are fighting for their very 
survival in the face of a rapid cyclical downturn that 
extends to all major markets. No carmaker has been 
shielded from the economic downturn. Even Toyota 
faces a downgrade of its long-term corporate credit 
rating. Yet the Detroit Three entered this recession at  Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
less than full strength, as they were already grappling 
with serious structural problems, such as the sizable 
legacy costs of their retired employees and their over-
dependence on sales of large cars and trucks. In that way, 
cyclical and structural issues are currently intermingled. 
It turns out that the decline in the U.S. market 
share of the Detroit automakers took place in several 
distinct phases. By the end of the 1960s, imports had 
established a solid foothold in the U.S. market, capturing 
nearly 15 percent of sales. The 1979 oil shock accom-
panied by a severe downturn in the economy saw a fast 
increase in the share of imports from 18 percent in 1978 
to 26.5 percent just two years later. As a result, the three 
Detroit carmakers’ market share fell to 73 percent for 
the first time (see figures 1 and 2). Chrysler narrowly 
avoided bankruptcy by successfully petitioning for gov-
ernment support in 1979–80. During the following de-
cade and a half, the fortunes of Chrysler, Ford, and 
GM as a group stabilized with the emergence of light 
trucks—such as minivans, sport utility vehicles (SUVs), 
and pickup trucks—as a popular and fast-growing seg-
ment of the auto market.4 The Detroit carmakers aver-
aged around 72 percent of total light vehicle sales—that 
is, sales of passenger cars and light trucks—in the U.S. 
market between 1980 and 1996.5 The most recent epi-
sode of steadily (and, over the past three years, rather 
quickly) declining market share began in the mid-1990s.6 
Foreign producers started to compete in the light truck 
segment, the last remaining stronghold of domestic 
carmakers, while continuing to make inroads in the 
passenger car segment. Starting in 1998, the price of 
gasoline was rising again, after having been essentially 
flat for over a decade. As gas prices approached $4.00 
per gallon at the beginning of the summer of 2008, the 
Detroit carmakers were scrambling to adjust to the rapid 
switch by consumers to smaller, more fuel-efficient 
vehicles. In combination with the ongoing market share 
loss, the sharp downturn of vehicle sales experienced 
during the second half of 2008 pushed the Detroit car-
makers to the brink of extinction. The seriousness of 
the situation was highlighted when Chrysler and GM 
asked for federal government aid to stave off bankruptcy 
toward the end of 2008 and again in February 2009.
In this article, I discuss in detail how the Detroit 
automakers lost their dominance of the U.S. auto mar-
ket. My key insight is that the decline in the fortunes 
of the Detroit automakers took place in three distinct 
phases: the mid-1950s to 1980, 1980 to 1996, and 1996 
to 2008 (see figure 1).7 I also draw on evidence such as 
changes in the automakers’ profitability and bond ratings 
to illustrate the decline of the Detroit Three. In describing 
how the U.S. auto industry has evolved since the mid-
1950s, my aim is to provide a historical frame of reference 
for the ongoing debate about the future of this industry. 
Literature review
The industrial organization literature includes a 
number of studies examining the business decisions 
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The Detroit Three’s U.S. market share, 1955–2008 
Notes: The Detroit Three are Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Over the 1955–79 period, the market 
share is measured for passenger cars only. From 1980 onward, it is measured for light vehicles (both passenger cars and light trucks, 
such as minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks). The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession as identified by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research; the dashed vertical line indicates the most recent business cycle peak.
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of the Detroit automakers from 1945 through the early 
1980s. White (1972) explains in great detail how for-
eign carmakers first entered the U.S. market during the 
second half of the 1950s by offering small cars. Impor-
tantly, according to a report by the National Academy 
of Engineering and National Research Council (1982), 
at that time small cars were just as expensive to pro-
duce as large cars for the Detroit carmakers; as a result, 
the domestic automakers were not able to compete 
profitably with the foreign producers in this market 
segment. Kwoka (1984) argues that the concentration 
of market power among Chrysler, Ford, and GM during 
the 1950s and 1960s influenced their response to com-
petition in the following decades. This concentration 
of market power, Kwoka (1984, p. 509) writes, “ren-
dered the companies vulnerable to outside forces and 
ultimately induced responses that proved damaging to 
the entire U.S. industry.” Since the Detroit carmakers 
had such great market power back then, they were 
complacent and not quick to change their automo-
biles to match their new competitors’ innovations and 
the public’s changing tastes during the 1970s. Writing 
in the mid-1980s, Kwoka (1984, p. 521) contends 
that, “there seems abundant reason for continuing 
concern over the long-run competitive properties of 
the U.S. auto industry.” 
Related literature focuses on structural changes 
in the industry. Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990) 
document the arrival of lean manufacturing techniques 
and their implications for competition in the auto  
industry. Lean manufacturing is a production system 
pioneered in Japan. It emphasizes production quality, 
speedy response to market conditions, low levels of 
inventory, and frequent deliveries of parts (Klier, 1994). 
Baily et al. (2005) attempt to measure the contribution 
of lean manufacturing to productivity improvements 
in the auto industry.8 Rubenstein (1992) illustrates 
how the market for motor vehicles has become more 
fragmented as the number of sales per individual model 
has fallen. He goes on to show how that particular 
trend helped reconcentrate the geography of car pro-
duction in North America. Helper and Sako (1995) 
highlight the growing role of automaker–supplier re-
lations, especially as a source of competitive advantage 
for certain automakers. McAlinden (2004; 2007a, b) 
provides analysis of the relations between the Detroit 
automakers and their principal union, the United Auto 
Workers (UAW),9 as they grappled with the issue of 
legacy costs of their retirees early in the twenty-first 
century. McCarthy (2007) presents an environmental 
history of the automobile, highlighting the interplay of 
consumer preferences, government regulations, and the 
business interests of carmakers. Klier and Linn (2008) 
estimate the demand for fuel efficiency by consumers 
and suggest that up to half of the market share decline 
of the Detroit carmakers between 2002 and 2007 can 
be attributed to the rising price of gasoline. Klier and 
McMillen (2008) analyze the evolving geography of 
the motor vehicle parts sector. They document the 
emergence of “auto alley,” a north–south corridor in 
which the industry is concentrated. Auto alley ex-
tends from Detroit to the Gulf of Mexico, with fingers 
reaching into Ontario, Canada. 
Furthermore, a number of popular business books 
document the struggles of the U.S. automakers over the 
past two decades (for example, Ingrassia and White, 
1994; and Maynard, 2003). As I mentioned previously, 
my contribution to this vast and varied literature is to 
further detail how the Detroit automakers lost their 
dominance of the U.S. automobile market in three 
distinct phases: the mid-1950s to 1980, 1980 to 1996, 
and 1996 to 2008. In the subsequent sections, I discuss 
what happened in each of these phases.
From mid-1950s to 1980: Imports and  
oil prices challenge Detroit
The dominance of Chrysler, Ford, and GM in the 
U.S. automobile market peaked in 1955, when their 
market share reached 94.5 percent.10 The three com-
panies continued to dominate the U.S. auto industry 
for many years, yet their collective influence slowly 
began to wane. 
Imports first make inroads
While the three Detroit automakers had more 
than once considered producing small cars since 1945, 
they regularly dismissed these plans as being unprof-
itable. In addition, neither Chrysler, Ford, nor GM 
wanted to enter the market for small cars on its own. 
The Detroit automakers felt the market for small cars 
needed to be big enough to accommodate all three of 
them (White, 1972; and Kwoka, 1984). Gomez-Ibanez 
and Harrison (1982, pp. 319–320) suggest that, tradi-
tionally, the U.S. carmakers had been insulated from 
international competition by catering to the domestic 
demand for larger and more luxurious cars than those 
made elsewhere. Higher per capita incomes, lower gaso-
line prices, longer driving distances, and wider roads 
all accounted for the fact that vehicles purchased in the 
U.S. market tended to be larger than those in other mar-
kets. Conversely, a foreign producer would be somewhat 
reluctant to produce a U.S.-style automobile that it 
could not sell in significant numbers in its home mar-
ket. According to Gomez-Ibanez and Harrison (1982,  
p. 320), imported vehicles “thus were largely restricted 
to small cars (which could also be sold in the foreign 5 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
producer’s home market) and sports or specialty cars 
(where economy of scale may be less important).” 
It took the independent American carmakers (at 
the time they were the Nash-Kelvinator Corporation, 
Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, Willys-Overland Motors, 
and Hudson Motor Car Company) to introduce small 
cars during 1950.11 However, as White (1972, p. 184) 
noted, “by setting prices that were above those of full-
size sedans, the independents virtually eliminated any 
chances that their small cars might succeed.” Only a 
few years later, during the mid-1950s, small cars made 
their first significant appearance in the U.S. market by 
way of imports (figure 2). As the U.S. economy moved 
into recession during the second half of 1957, small, 
inexpensive European cars quickly became very suc-
cessful in the American marketplace.12 According to 
McCarthy (2007, p. 142), “a substantial change in 
consumer preferences took place between 1955 and 
1959.” Led by Germany’s Volkswagen (VW) Beetle, 
imports rose quickly during the second half of the 
1950s, reaching 10.1 percent of the U.S. market in 
1959. At the time, imports represented 75 percent  
to 80 percent of smaller economy cars in the United 
States (McCarthy, 2007, p. 144).
The Detroit automakers respond
The Detroit automakers responded by first import-
ing products from their European subsidiaries during 
1957. In the fall of 1959, they introduced domestically 
produced  compact cars in the U.S. market, such as the 
Chevrolet Corvair, the Ford Falcon, and the Plymouth 
Valiant. These vehicles were significantly smaller than 
what Detroit carmakers had offered before. Their strategy 
of producing compact cars succeeded, quickly pushing 
back the level of imports—they fell to 4.9 percent of 
the U.S. market in 1962. 
However, starting in the mid-1960s, the Detroit 
carmakers decided to make their compacts slightly 
larger. According to a report by the National Academy 
of Engineering and National Research Council (1982, 
p. 70), “the large domestic companies sought to fill a 
segment of the market just above the imports in terms 
of price and size.” These new models were produced 
in the United States and first introduced through the 
car companies’ middle-level brands. Within a few years, 
the Detroit automakers’ low-priced compacts started 
to grow in size and cost. Kwoka (1984, p. 517) notes 
the following: “By 1966, the Corvair had grown by 
3.8 inches, the Falcon by 3.1 inches, and the Valiant 
by 4.6 inches. By the end of the 1960s, these vehicles 
would weigh from 250 to 600 pounds more than at 
introduction, and it was doubtful consumers perceived 
them as small cars any longer.” White (1972, p. 189) 
suggests that this response was prompted by the obser-
vation that many consumers who bought small cars 
were willing to pay a premium for a deluxe interior 
and exterior trim. In effect the Detroit automakers grew 
their “small” vehicles in size after having beaten back 
the original entry of foreign small cars; as McCarthy 
(2007, p. 145) contends, “Detroit’s commitment to this 
market went no further than stemming the inroads of 
the imports.” It is not surprising that the victory over  
imported small cars proved to be only temporary.13
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Déjà vu 
Continued preference for small cars among con-
sumers prompted a second wave of import growth, 
beginning in the mid-1960s.14 Spearheaded by VW’s 
success, import sales began to rise again, surpassing 
the previous record in 1968, when they had reached 
10.8 percent of the U.S. market (see figure 2, p. 5).  
In response, the Detroit automakers again initially im-
ported products from Europe (White, 1972). Only two 
years later, Detroit introduced the first U.S.-made sub-
compacts: the GM Vega (in September 1970); the Ford 
Maverick (in April 1969) and Pinto (in September 1970); 
and the American Motors Corporation (AMC) Hornet 
(in August 1969) and Gremlin (in February 1970).15
This time the Detroit carmakers’ product strategy 
was not able to lower the import penetration of foreign 
nameplate products. By the early 1970s, import brands 
had become quite entrenched in the U.S. market. They 
had established stronger dealer networks as well as a solid 
reputation for quality among consumers (Kwoka 1984, 
p. 517; and National Academy of Engineering and 
National Research Council, 1982, pp. 72–73). Looking 
back at Detroit’s response to the two waves of imports, 
Kwoka (1984, p. 517) writes that “the domestic small 
cars did, however, manage to halt the growth of imports 
for about five years.” Unlike in the early 1960s, the 
imports did not get beaten back this time. The early 
1970s also saw the Japanese nameplate imports out-
sell those of VW, which had pioneered the segment of 
the small car import with its Beetle car in the 1950s.16
Around the same time, the safety of automobiles, 
especially that of the Detroit automakers’ products, re-
ceived widespread attention as a result of Ralph Nader’s 
1965 book, Unsafe at Any Speed: The Designed-In 
Dangers of the American Automobile. Nader (1965) 
detailed the reluctance of American car manufactur-
ers to improve vehicle safety. In the wake of the en-
suing public debate, the federal government for the 
first time established safety as well as environmental 
standards for motor vehicles—for example, mandating 
standards for bumpers in 1973 or requiring the instal-
lation of equipment such as the catalytic converter  
(a device used to reduce the toxicity of emissions 
from an internal combustion engine) in 1975. 
Similar to what the Detroit carmakers did with 
their compact cars introduced during the late 1950s, 
they grew their subcompacts launched during 1969 
and 1970 in size and weight within a few years.17 In 
light of the two oil crises experienced during the 1970s, 
the timing of that decision was quite unfortunate. Be-
tween October 1973 and May 1974, the real price of 
gasoline rose 28 percent. After flattening out, it increased 
again sharply during 1978 (figure 3). The market share 
of import brands started to grow again by the mid-
1970s. It increased quite rapidly toward the end of the 
decade, breaking 25 percent for the first time in 1980 
(figure 2, p. 5).
Consumers respond
Consumers quickly responded to the rapid in-
crease in the price of gasoline following the Iran oil 
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U.S. retail gasoline prices, 1970–2008
Notes: Real dollar values are in 2000 dollars. The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research; the dashed vertical line indicates the most recent business cycle peak.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from the U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration; and White (1971).
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embargo of 1979. The price of gasoline increased by 
80 percent between January 1979 and March 1980. 
As a result of this sharp increase, consumers shifted 
their purchases away from large U.S. cars toward small 
(foreign and domestic) cars offering better fuel efficiency 
(figure 4, panel A); a similar consumer response would 
occur almost three decades later when the price of gaso-
line rose dramatically in 2007–08 (figure 4, panel B), 
and I will discuss this later in the article. By April 
1979, there was a run on small cars; indeed, demand 
for small cars in the United States was so great that 
the Detroit automakers themselves could not meet it, 
given their limited capacity for making such cars at 
the time. Fieleke (1982, p. 83) writes that “since foreign 
producers were already making such cars for their 
own markets, they were able to expand their exports 
to the U.S. market quickly.”18 In addition, McCarthy 
(2007, p. 224) notes the following: “By year-end 
1979 nearly 60 percent of the cars sold in the United 
States were subcompacts and compacts. With the ten 
most fuel-efficient cars sold in America all foreign 
made, sales of small Japanese imports soared, and 
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Notes: Market shares of automobiles and nominal price of gasoline were indexed to 100 in January 1979 for panel A and in January 2007 for 
panel B. Prior to 1980, large cars were referred to as full-size cars. Because of the rising popularity of light trucks, I included large light trucks 
with large cars in panel B. Light trucks include vehicles such as minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks.
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data from Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, 1980 and 1981; Ward’s AutoInfoBank; and U.S. Department 
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foreign sales—70 percent of them by Japanese makers—
approached the 25 percent market-share barrier for 
the first time.” 
Foreign cars sold well in the United States not only 
because they offered better fuel efficiency, but also be-
cause they were competitively priced and widely per-
ceived to be of superior quality (Fieleke, 1982, p. 88). 
By the end of the 1970s, the Japanese automakers 
dominated the domestic producers in product quality 
ratings for every auto market segment, representing a 
formidable competitive advantage (National Academy 
of Engineering and National Research Council, 1982, 
p. 99). The quality gap between U.S.-produced cars and 
foreign cars was beyond dispute (Kwoka, 1984, p. 518). 
Regulatory response
The energy crisis subsequent to the 1973 Arab oil 
embargo turned fuel economy into an important auto-
mobile policy goal for the U.S. government (McCarthy, 
2007, p. 217). In 1975, Congress imposed mandatory 
corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards 
for the first time. The standards were to become effec-
tive by model year 1978 and result in an average fuel 
efficiency of passenger cars of 27.5 miles per gallon by 
1985. To check for compliance, the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency was to test the vehicles in a lab 
and continues to do so today.
According to the CAFE requirements, for a given 
model year each manufacturer’s vehicles for sale in 
the United States are divided into three fleets: domestic 
passenger cars, foreign-produced passenger cars, and 
light trucks. Passenger cars were subject to a stricter 
fuel efficiency standard than light trucks.19 The origi-
nal justification for establishing a different and more 
lenient fuel efficiency standard for light trucks was 
their primary usage as commercial and agricultural 
vehicles (Cooney and Yacobucci, 2005, p. 87). Subse-
quently, the existence of two different standards has 
affected the ways in which new vehicles are designed 
(and classified).20
To sum up, by the early 1980s, foreign competi-
tors had successfully challenged Chrysler, Ford, and 
GM in their home market, irrevocably changing the 
industry. Differences in product mix and product quality 
were key to the success of foreign carmakers. “The 
huge increase in the price of gasoline from 1979 to 
1980 sharply exacerbated a long-run deterioration in 
the competitive position of the U.S. [auto] industry,” 
notes Fieleke (1982, p. 91). The auto sector, along with 
the rest of the economy, was pummeled by a severe 
recession; unit sales of motor vehicles fell by 18 per-
cent from 1979 to 1980. Caught between competition 
from rising imports and a deteriorating economy, the 
three Detroit automakers were reeling. Chrysler, on the 
verge of financial collapse, applied for federal loan 
guarantees in 1979 and received them in the amount 
of $1.5 billion in 1980 (Cooney and Yacobucci, 2005, 
p. 55). Ford and the UAW sought relief from the in-
creased number of vehicle imports by filing a trade 
safeguard case in 1980. That request was denied by the 
U.S. International Trade Commission, which determined 
that imports were not the major cause of the industry’s 
troubles. Subsequently, a bill was proposed in 1981 that 
would have enacted quotas on motor vehicle imports 
from Japan. Following a suggestion by the Reagan 
administration, Japan instead agreed to impose a  
so-called voluntary export restraint, or VER.21
A National Academy of Engineering and National 
Research Council (1982, p. 4) report sums up the 
changes that had occurred in the U.S. auto industry 
during the 1970s and early 1980s as follows: “Com-
petition in the U.S. auto industry has undergone fun-
damental changes in the last 10 years, primarily because 
of increased market penetration by foreign manufac-
turers and drastic shifts in the price of oil.”22
From 1980 to 199: Detroit stages  
a comeback 
Things were starting look up again for the Detroit 
carmakers as the economy emerged from the 1980 
and 1981–82 recessions. By 1985, light vehicle sales 
had surpassed the previous industry record from 1978 
(figure 5). Starting in 1983, each of the three Detroit 
automakers reported positive net income (figure 6); and 
Chrysler repaid the last of the government-backed loans 
it had obtained in 1980, several years ahead of schedule. 
By 1986, the price of gasoline had substantially retreated 
from its 1981 peak, adding further stimulus to the de-
mand for vehicles. The imposition of the VER limited 
vehicle imports from Japan, and this resulted in the 
establishment of North American production facilities 
by the Japanese carmakers. Between 1982 and 1989, 
five Japanese automakers (Honda, Nissan, Toyota, 
Mitsubishi, and Subaru) started producing vehicles  
in the United States. As the period of low gasoline 
prices persisted, the Detroit automakers increasingly 
specialized in the production of large vehicles. 
The Detroit automakers manage to recover
By the early 1990s, the revival of the three Detroit 
automakers was in full swing.23 Lee Iacocca, then 
chief operating officer of Chrysler, said: “All of us—
Ford, GM, Chrysler—built a lot of lousy cars in the 
early 1980s. And we paid the price. We lost a lot of 
our market to the import competition. But that forced 
us to wake up and start building better cars” (Ingrassia 9 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
and White, 1994, p. 14). Each of the three carmakers 
had taken a different path to reform.24 Ultimately,  
reform meant learning the lessons of lean manufacturing 
and applying them in a cost-effective way while building 
products that consumers wanted to buy. Initially, the 
Detroit carmakers benefited from the rebound in eco-
nomic activity in the early 1980s. They also launched 
innovative products, such as Chrysler’s minivan and 
Ford’s prominently styled Taurus family sedan. Once 
they were profitable again, the Detroit automakers 
started to focus on mergers and acquisitions during the 
second half of the 1980s. The three companies spent 
billions of dollars on acquiring automotive as well as 
nonautomotive companies. GM acquired Electronic Data 
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U.S. light vehicle sales, 1960–2008
Notes: Light vehicles are passenger cars and light trucks, such as minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks. The shaded areas 
indicate official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research; the dashed vertical line indicates the  
most recent business cycle peak.  
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The Detroit Three’s net income, 1980–2007
Notes: The Detroit Three are Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation (GM). The data series on Chrysler net 
income ends in 1997. In 1998, Chrysler merged with Daimler; it was sold to Cerberus Capital Management LP  , a private equity company, in 
2007. The shaded areas indicate official periods of recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research; the dashed vertical 
line indicates the most recent business cycle peak.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Compustat, accessed through Wharton Research Data Services.
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Systems (EDS) in 1984, as well as Hughes Aircraft in 
1985. Chrysler bought Gulfstream in 1985 and AMC 
in 1987. All three automakers acquired major stakes 
in car rental companies during the late 1980s. Ford 
bought Jaguar in 1990, and GM acquired a majority 
of Saab in the same year. However, most of these 
transactions were unwound within a decade, and with 
the exception of the AMC acquisition,25 the car com-
panies then acquired have since either been sold or 
are currently for sale. In any case, the acquisitions 
took up valuable time and attention of the companies’ 
management back then. And so the recovery of the 
three Detroit carmakers took twists and turns along 
the way. It also involved changes in top management 
and leadership. GM is a case in point.
During the early 1980s, GM’s leadership decided 
the best way to beat the foreign-based competition 
was to automate the production of automobiles when-
ever possible with the help of sophisticated technology. 
As a result, the company invested heavily in new capital 
equipment. It turned out to be a costly experiment, since 
it raised GM’s cost structure to the point that its North 
American auto business was barely breaking even 
during the late 1980s—a time of very strong industry 
sales (Ingrassia and White, 1994, p. 20). In terms of 
product quality, manufacturing efficiency, and new 
product design, “GM by 1985 was dead last in the  
industry” (Ingrassia and White, 1994, p. 93). GM  
also made an effort to learn from the leader in lean 
production at the time: In 1984 an entity called 
NUMMI (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.), 
representing a joint venture between GM and Toyota, 
began producing vehicles at a previously idle GM 
plant in Fremont, California. In the following year, 
GM established a new division called Saturn. It was 
to demonstrate that the company could successfully 
compete in the market for smaller cars by implementing 
best manufacturing practices. The first Saturn rolled 
off the assembly line at its new plant in Spring Hill, 
Tennessee, in 1990. Yet, according to Ingrassia and 
White’s (1994, p. 12) assessment of GM, “by January 
1992, ‘the General’ stood closer than the world knew 
to the brink of collapse. Its management had lost touch 
with its customers and with reality.” In 1993, GM’s bond 
rating dropped to BBB+, barely qualifying as invest-
ment grade;26 it was a far cry from the AAA rating the 
company had held just 12 years earlier (figure 7). 
Chrysler’s bonds had recovered to investment grade 
figurE 7
The Detroit Three’s bond ratings, 1980–2008
Notes: The Detroit Three are Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation (GM). In 1998, Chrysler merged with 
Daimler; it was sold to Cerberus Capital Management LP  , a private equity company, in 2007. A rating of BBB or above represents an 
investment grade bond; a bond is considered investment grade if it is judged by a rating agency as likely enough to meet payment 
obligations that banks are allowed to invest in it.
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TaBLE 1
Foreign automakers, by first year of production 
in the United States
  Volkswagen   1978
  Honda  1982
  Nissan  1983
  Toyota  1984
  Mitsubishi  1987
  Subaru  1989
  BMW  1994
  Mercedes  1997
  Hyundai  2005
  Kia  2009
Note: BMW means Bayerische Motoren Werke (Bavarian Motor 
Works).
Source: Automobile companies’ websites.
by 1994, and Ford’s bonds were back to an A rating 
after having risen to an AA rating during the late 1980s. 
Yet GM’s bond rating declined all through the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
To unwind the course that GM had taken during 
the 1980s, several changes in the company’s leader-
ship occurred in the early 1990s. GM went through a  
series of restructurings, including a board revolt leading 
to the ouster of the company’s chief executive officer 
in 1992. By the mid-1990s, GM had downsized three 
times in a relatively short time span—in 1986, 1990, 
and 1991—shedding many thousands of jobs and closing 
dozens of plants in the United States along the way. 
Foreign automakers start production  
in North America
The early 1980s also saw the beginning of the in-
ternationalization of light vehicle production in North 
America (table 1). VW, the largest European carmak-
er was first in setting up production operations in the 
United States. It started production in Westmoreland, 
Pennsylvania, in 1978 expecting to build on its success 
as a major importer of vehicles to the United States.27 
VW was followed by the Japanese during the 1980s,28 
the German producers BMW (Bayerische Motoren 
Werke, or Bavarian Motor Works) and Mercedes in 
the 1990s, and the Korean firms Hyundai and Kia 
early in the twenty-first century. 
The timing of the arrival of Japanese production 
operations in the United States is related to the over-
whelming success of Japanese cars in the U.S. market 
during the late 1970s. Then the growing trade deficit in 
motor vehicles received a great deal of attention in the 
political arena. Subsequently, Japan agreed to a vol-
untary export restraint for motor vehicles, which I 
mentioned previously. The initial ceiling for imports 
was set to 1.68 million units for the year ending in 
March 1982, representing a 7.7 percent decrease from 
the actual level of imports from Japan in 1980; the 
VER was subsequently raised to 1.83 million units in 
1984 and to 2.3 million units in 1985 (Cooney and 
Yacobucci, 2005, p. 56). The program ended in 1994 
(Benjamin, 1999). 
Having agreed to limit the level of vehicle exports 
to the U.S., the major Japanese automakers all started 
producing vehicles in North America. That development 
resulted in a rather dramatic shift in production by the 
foreign carmakers from overseas to North America.29 
Even though the level of foreign nameplate light vehicle 
sales was remarkably stable, averaging 4.2 million 
units between 1986 and 1996, U.S.-produced foreign 
nameplate vehicles grew from 466,000 units to 2.4 million 
units over the same period, corresponding to an offset-
ting decline in imports. Along the way, the U.S.-based 
assembly plants of foreign carmakers proved that lean 
manufacturing could successfully be implemented in 
North America. An integral part of the implementation 
of lean manufacturing by the foreign auto producers 
was the transfer of their homegrown approach to building 
and managing the supply chain to North America (see, 
for example, Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). 
Light trucks save the Detroit automakers 
In 1980, immediately following the 1979 oil 
shock, a consensus on the future of motor vehicle de-
mand in the United States had emerged. McCarthy 
(2007, pp. 227–228) notes that the popular press at 
the time, including Time, BusinessWeek, and Forbes, 
considered inexpensive energy to be a thing of the 
past—and with it, the big, fuel-inefficient car. In the 
aftermath of the 1970s oil shocks, nearly everyone 
believed the shift in consumer preference for smaller 
cars was permanent, but according to McCarthy 
(2007, p. 230), “the real question was what kind of 
cars would American consumers buy should condi-
tions change [again]?” 
The consensus outlook for the auto industry proved 
rather short-lived. Consumer preferences changed again 
in the 1980s—this time away from small cars (see 
McCarthy, 2007, p. 235). In addition, the price of 
gasoline declined rapidly from its 1981 peak. By the 
mid-1980s, the real price of gasoline was back to levels 
last seen in the early 1970s. At the time, Chrysler, 
Ford, and GM noticed the beginnings of a growing 
demand by U.S. consumers for larger vehicles. That 
shift was to last more than a decade.30 To their credit, 
the three Detroit automakers recognized this change 
in consumer behavior and adjusted their product mix 
accordingly. Chrysler marketed its first minivan in 1 Q/009, Economic Perspectives
1983. Ford launched the Explorer, an SUV, in 1990; 
that year Ford produced more light trucks than cars at 
its U.S. assembly plants (Cooney and Yacobucci, 2005, 
p. 27). Light trucks turned out to be very profitable for 
the Detroit automakers. Foreign producers faced a  
25 percent tariff on imported pickup trucks; yet they 
continued to focus on the production of cars in their 
North American plants.
As I mentioned briefly in the introduction, in auto 
industry terminology, minivans, SUVs, and pickup 
trucks are lumped together as light trucks. These light 
trucks turned out to be very popular with U.S. con-
sumers during the second half of the 1980s and all  
of the 1990s. Sales of light trucks increased from  
2.2 million units in 1980 to 9.4 million units in 2004, 
representing a dramatic shift in the composition of 
the market.31 Aided by less stringent fuel economy 
rules for light trucks, the full-size station wagon of 
the 1970s morphed into a minivan or SUV during the 
1990s. In the process, the fortunes of the Detroit au-
tomakers were looking up. Between 1980 and the 
mid-1990s, their U.S. market share stabilized—and 
even increased at times; over the decade and a half   
it averaged 72 percent (see figure 1, p. 3). At first 
glance, the decline in the domestic producers’ market 
share seemed over. Yet, underlying that success was 
an increasing concentration of the domestic carmak-
ers’ product portfolio in the light truck segment of the 
market; by 2004, 67 percent of the Detroit automakers’ 
vehicle sales were of light trucks (see figure 8). The 
Detroit carmakers had nearly abandoned the car seg-
ment in favor of larger, more profitable light trucks. 
Between 1985 and 1995, their car sales fell 33 percent, 
from just under 8 million units to 5.4 million units.32
To sum up, by the mid-1990s Detroit looked like 
a sure winner: The three carmakers were solidly prof-
itable, their market share seemed stabilized, and the 
competitors from Japan were distracted by their weak 
domestic economy. In fact, Nissan and Mazda were 
not profitable then. Both companies received capital 
and management infusions from non-Japanese com-
petitors (Nissan from Renault and Mazda from Ford). 
Chrysler even challenged the Japanese carmakers for 
the leadership in small cars with the development of 
the Neon, a small car that debuted in 1994. However, 
that car didn’t make a big impact in the marketplace, 
mostly because of the low cost of gasoline at the time. 
In hindsight, it is not surprising that the Detroit auto-
makers increasingly specialized in the light truck seg-
ment. In fact, the light truck share of sales went up for 
their foreign-based competitors as well (figure 8).33 
Yet by being significantly more concentrated in that 
segment than their competitors, Chrysler, Ford, and 
GM had exposed themselves to developments that 
could upset their comeback (Cooney and Yacobucci, 
2005, pp. 68–69). 
FIguRE 8
Light truck share of U.S. auto sales, 1980–2008
Notes: The Detroit Three are Chrysler LLC, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors Corporation. Light trucks include vehicles such as 
minivans, sport utility vehicles, and pickup trucks.
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from Ward’s AutoInfoBank.
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From 199 to 008: Detroit on the 
defensive—again
The foreign carmakers started to enter the U.S. 
light truck segment in earnest in the mid-1990s. For 
example, Honda launched its first minivan, the Odyssey, 
in 1995. Toyota began production of a full-size pick-
up truck, the Tundra, in 1999. The Detroit automak-
ers’ market share fell 26 percentage points from 1996 
to the end of 2008, representing an average decline  
of just over 2 percentage points a year. Yet, industry 
sales volumes of light vehicles continued to rise until 
the year 2000 (see figure 5, p. 9). In fact, 1999 and 
2000 were the two best-selling years for light vehicles. 
The rising sales volume enabled the Detroit carmakers 
to remain profitable despite the market share decline. 
Ford even acquired the car division of the Swedish 
company Volvo for nearly $6.5 billion in 1999. Yet 
the Detroit Three’s bond ratings were declining (fig-
ure 7, p. 10). In fact, at the end of 2008, GM’s bond 
rating had fallen to CC, a full level below Chrysler’s 
bond rating in 1981. Detroit Three light truck sales 
leveled off in 1999 at 6.7 million units, while overall light 
truck sales continued to rise until 2004, to 9.4 million 
units.34 A remarkable run had come to an end. 
Legacy costs
The U.S. auto industry nearly shrugged off the 2001 
recession. With the help of clever incentive programs, 
such as “zero percent financing,” light vehicle sales in 
2001 barely dipped below the record set the year before 
(see figure 5, p. 9). In fact, sales between 1999 and 
2007 were above 16 million units per year, representing 
a period of unprecedented sales and production volume 
in this industry. Yet the long-term bond ratings of the 
Detroit carmakers continued to fall as they were hobbled 
by structural labor cost issues (see figure 7, p. 10). 
After years of shedding workers, the carmakers were 
left with a work force of long tenure as well as a large 
number of retirees who were able to draw on benefits 
negotiated during their active employment.35
In 2007, the Detroit carmakers negotiated a new 
labor agreement with the UAW. These contracts began 
to address the issue of legacy costs, which are primarily 
projected health care costs for retirees. The ratified 
contracts included agreements on the establishment 
of so-called VEBAs (voluntary employees’ beneficiary 
associations), which are independently administered 
trusts that are established with funds from the Detroit 
carmakers. The VEBAs were designed to take responsi-
bility for retiree health care liabilities starting in 2010. 
The 2007 labor contracts also included agreements on 
a so-called second-tier wage for new hires.36 It was 
designed to allow the labor cost structure to be brought 
in line with that of the foreign producers. Yet, in the 
overall declining market experienced since, as well as 
in the continuing decline in the Detroit Three’s market 
share, there has been little hiring at the lower wage 
rate, despite several rounds of employee buyout pro-
grams offered by each of the Detroit carmakers. This 
has prolonged the period of relatively higher labor 
costs for the Detroit carmakers. According to the terms 
of the financing provided by the federal government 
in December 2008, the structure of the Detroit carmakers’ 
labor costs was one of the issues that needed to be  
addressed going forward.37 The onset of the current 
recession necessitated a less incremental approach to 
reforming the cost structure of the Detroit Three auto-
makers than what had been agreed to in 2007.
Price of gasoline rises and segment shift ends  
era of big cars (trucks)—again
The Detroit automakers’ market share decline  
accelerated as the price of gasoline—which had inexora-
bly inched up since the late 1990s—rose dramatically 
in 2007 and the first half of 2008, right as the overall 
economy began to soften (figure 3, p. 6). The rising 
cost of refueling a vehicle brought fuel efficiency con-
siderations to the forefront of consumers’ minds once 
again. In fact, the consumer response to the increase 
in the price of gasoline in 2007–08 very closely re-
sembled the consumer response to the 1979–80 oil 
price shock (see figure 4, p. 7). While the specific timing 
of the rise in the price of gasoline differs somewhat  
in the two episodes, the price of gasoline rose 80 per-
cent in 1979–80 as well as in 2007–08. Consumers 
responded by purchasing more small cars and fewer 
large cars in both cases.
As a result, the Detroit Three quickly had to reverse 
course to meet the changing demand. For example, in 
2007 and 2008, Toyota’s hybrid, the Prius, outsold the 
Ford Explorer by a factor of 1.6.38 It appeared once again 
as if the foreign producers had the upper hand. The abil-
ity to quickly adjust production to meet demand emerged 
as a key competitive factor in light of this sudden shock 
facing the auto industry. The Japanese producers were 
importing small cars from production facilities around 
the world. The fact that the euro had appreciated substan-
tially against the U.S. dollar prevented U.S. carmakers 
from quickly being able to draw on their European 
product offerings for the U.S. market.
During the second half of 2008, economic condi-
tions worsened quickly. As consumer confidence was 
plunging to new depths, light vehicle sales rates dropped 
to barely above 10 million units on a seasonally ad-
justed annual basis during the fourth quarter.39 The year 
ended with Chrysler and GM, as well as their financ-
ing arms Chrysler Financial and GMAC (General 1 Q/009, Economic Perspectives
NOTES
Motors Acceptance Corporation), receiving nearly 
$25 billion in financial assistance from the federal 
government (for a detailed recap of the events, see 
Cooney et al., 2009). In light of further declines in 
auto sales during January and February of 2009, Chrysler 
and GM asked for additional assistance in mid-February, 
when they submitted their business plans to the U.S. 
Department of the Treasury.40 As this issue goes to press 
in early May 2009, Chrysler filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection, having failed to reach an agreement 
on restructuring its debt—a key element in shaping a 
viable business plan by April 30, 2009, the deadline 
set by the federal government.41
Conclusion
In this article, I have illustrated in some detail 
how   the Detroit Three’s market power in the U.S. auto 
industry eroded over the course of the past five-plus 
1Additional factors to consider are the proper definition of the market 
of interest, possible barriers to entry into the market, and the dynamics 
of oligopoly discipline. 
2See Klier and McMillen (2006).
3These numbers are my calculations based on data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics via Haver Analytics. 
4A light truck, or light-duty truck, is a classification for trucks or truck-
based vehicles with a payload capacity of less than 4,000 pounds.
5These are my calculations based on data from various issues of 
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook, as well as Ward’s AutoInfoBank  
(database by subscription).
6Detroit Three market share in 1996 stood at 74 percent. By 2005, it 
had fallen to 58 percent. By the end of 2008, it was down to 48 percent 
(see figure 1).
7The three periods were chosen based on trends in market shares. 
8Baily et al. (2005, p. 11) attribute the largest contribution to auto 
sector productivity growth in the U.S. between 1987 and 2002 to 
process improvements in existing plants, such as the implementa-
tion of lean manufacturing.
9The UAW’s full name is the International Union, United Automobile, 
Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
10The year 1955 was also the breakthrough year for the German  
automaker Volkswagen (VW) in the United States; sales of the VW 
Beetle almost doubled from 28,907 in 1954 to 50,011 in 1955, repre-
senting 55 percent of all auto imports at the time (McCarthy, 2007, 
p. 133).
11In early 1954, the Nash-Kelvinator Corporation and the Hudson Motor 
Car Company merged to form American Motors Corporation 
(AMC), which was headquartered in the Detroit area.
decades. The decline took place in three distinct phas-
es: the mid-1950s to 1980, 1980 to 1996, and 1996 to 
2008. The presence of foreign carmakers, the price of 
gasoline, and the emergence of light trucks played major 
roles in this transition. Today, even the terminology has 
adjusted to the new reality: Chrysler, Ford, and GM 
are now referred to as the Detroit Three (no longer as 
the Big Three), since the market structure in the U.S. 
automobile industry has changed from a Big Three 
model to a “Big Six” model.42 Today’s U.S. auto indus-
try is also much more international, with ten foreign-
headquartered automakers producing light vehicles in 
the United States.43 A period of remarkable dominance 
by a few companies in a large industry had come to 
an end at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
12Ironically, at the same time, cars produced by the Detroit Three 
were growing bigger and more expensive (White, 1972, p. 184).
13Kwoka (1984) suggests that the three Detroit carmakers’ strategy 
can be explained as “dynamic limit pricing.” Such a strategy can 
apply in a situation where a dominant firm or group of firms has 
little or no cost advantage over a fringe. Its long-run profit-maximiz-
ing strategy therefore is to raise prices and thereby permit growth 
of the fringe, since doing this would at least initially result in ex-
cess profit (Kwoka, 1984, pp. 512–513).
14According to a report by the National Academy of Engineering 
and National Research Council (1982, p. 70), “the rise of the small 
car reflected fundamental demographic trends (increased suburbaniza-
tion, shifts in the age structure, changes in female labor participation) 
and the growth of multicar families.” The years in which import shares 
rose again, 1965–71, also marked a period in which domestic small 
cars were being redesigned into larger vehicles (Kwoka, 1984).
15McCarthy (2007). Chrysler, at the time, imported its subcompacts: 
The Plymouth Cricket was produced in England, and the Dodge 
Colt was built for Chrysler in Japan by Mitsubishi.
16By 1975, Toyota was the leading import brand, ahead of Volkswagen.
17A National Academy of Engineering and National Research Council 
(1982, p. 3) report suggests that the three Detroit carmakers’ response 
to imports of small cars had been “conditioned by a legacy of large-
car production. Large cars were associated with luxury and prestige 
and commanded premium prices; in terms of cost, however, small 
cars were just about as expensive to make; the result: small cars, 
small profits.”
18In line with what Fieleke (1982) states, in 1980 Abraham Katz, 
then Assistant Secretary of Commerce, made the following obser-
vation in testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee 
on Ways and Means: “Early in 1979 … a sudden disruption in OPEC 
[Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil shipments 
and large OPEC price increases led quickly to sharp increases in 
the price of gasoline and to renewed gas station lines. … Consumers 
reacted by shifting toward small, fuel-efficient cars. Small car sales 15 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
32In 2002, foreign nameplate cars outsold domestic nameplate cars 
for the first time. By 2008, domestic nameplates represented only 
35 percent of all U.S. auto sales. See note 31 for source.
33For example, early in the twenty-first century, Toyota built an  
assembly plant in San Antonio, Texas, that was dedicated to the 
production of the Tundra, its full-size pickup truck.
34These numbers are from Ward’s AutoInfoBank.
35See Cooney (2005) for a comparison of the steel and auto industries 
with regard to legacy costs. McAlinden (2007b) calculates the health 
care costs for active and retired employees per vehicle produced in 
2005 to amount to $1,268 for GM and $945 for Ford.
36All entry hires’ base wages were set to range between $11.50 and 
$16.23 per hour, nearly half of the hourly base wage according to 
the existing pay scale (McAlinden, 2007a).
37On March 11, 2009, Ford announced that it had reached an agree-
ment with the UAW on labor cost savings amounting to $500 million 
annually. According to the new agreement, Ford’s compensation 
(including benefits, pensions, and bonuses) will be $55 per hour; 
that compares with $48 per hour paid by foreign automakers pro-
ducing in the United States (Bennett and Terlep, 2009).
38This number is my calculation based on data from Ward’s 
AutoInfoBank.
39Ibid.
40On March 30, 2009, the Obama administration announced it  
had found the business plans submitted by Chrysler and GM to  
be not viable. The administration extended the original deadline  
of March 31, 2009, for the two automakers to demonstrate their  
future viability—by 30 days for Chrysler and by 60 days for GM. 
Both companies were required to draw up more aggressive restruc-
turing plans by their new respective deadlines. Until then, Chrysler 
and GM would be provided with working capital if needed. The 
administration’s assessment stated that, absent more drastic re-
structuring, the two carmakers’ “best chance of success may well 
require utilizing the bankruptcy court in a quick and surgical way.” 
See www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Fact_Sheet_GM_
Chrysler_FIN.pdf.
41For more details on Chrysler entering bankruptcy, see www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Obama-Administration-Auto- 
Restructuring-Initiative/.
42The Big Six consist of Chrysler, Ford, GM, Honda, Nissan,  
and Toyota.
43Despite the increase in the number of companies selling vehicles in 
the United States, the share of vehicles produced in North America since 
1980 has remained remarkably stable at approximately 80 percent, 
according to my calculations using data from Ward’s AutoInfoBank.
jumped to a 57 percent share of the market in 1979. U.S. small car 
production ran virtually at capacity, but was unable to keep up with 
demand. With an inadequate supply of domestic small cars, many con-
sumers turned to imports, the traditional source of small, fuel-efficient 
cars. Their present success in the United States is a case of being in 
the right place at the right time with the right product” (Katz, 1980).
19For cars, the standard stands at 27.5 miles per gallon for model 
year 2009; for light trucks, the standard is set at 23.1 miles per  
gallon for model year 2009 (Yacobucci, 2009).
20A set of stricter fuel efficiency regulations, CAFE II, was passed 
by Congress in December 2007. It established a new fleet average 
fuel efficiency standard of 35 miles per gallon by the model year 
2020. While CAFE II will likely impose significant costs to meet 
compliance, it is not clear how individual carmakers will be affected, 
since the rules for implementing the new law have not been released 
yet (Yacobucci and Bamberger, 2008, p. 1).
21See Cooney and Yacobucci (2005, p. 56).
22Incidentally, increased foreign competition influenced the decision by 
the Federal Trade Commission to end its five-year antitrust investigation 
of automobile manufacturing in the United States (Fieleke, 1982, p. 89).
23This section draws on Ingrassia and White (1994).
24See Ingrassia and White (1994) for a wealth of examples describing 
the three companies’ travails during the 1980s.
25The Jeep brand is all that survived into the twenty-first century 
from what was once AMC.
26A bond is considered investment grade if it is judged by a rating 
agency as likely enough to meet payment obligations that banks 
are allowed to invest in it.
27These expectations were not borne out as VW closed that plant  
in 1989. The company recently announced its return to the United 
States as a producer. It will build a new assembly operation in 
Chattanooga, Tennessee, to begin production by 2010.
28Honda started producing cars in central Ohio in 1982. In 1989, its 
family sedan, the Honda Accord, became the best-selling car in the 
United States.
29According to my analysis using data from Ward’s AutoInfoBank, 
foreign nameplate vehicles represented 6 percent of U.S. production in 
1985; 13 percent in 1990; 22 percent in 2000; and 41 percent in 
2008.
30The groundswell of interest in sport utility vehicles began in 1983 
(McCarthy, 2007, p. 233).
31By 1990, the share of light trucks among light vehicle sales had 
risen to 35 percent, according to my analysis using data from Ward’s 
AutoInfoBank. Between 2001 and 2008, light truck sales represented 
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